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Abstract—Consumers of Internet content typically pay an
Internet Service Provider (ISP) to connect to the Internet. A
content provider (CP) may charge consumers for its content or
may earn via advertising revenue. In such settings, a matter
of continuing debate, under the umbrella of net neutrality
regulations, is whether an ISP serving a consumer may in
addition charge the CPs not directly connected to the ISP for
delivering their content to consumers connected to the ISP. We
attempt an answer by looking at the problem through the lens of
a regulator whose mandate is to maximize the cumulative welfare
of ISPs, CPs, and consumers.
Specifically, we consider a two-sided market model, in which
a local monopoly ISP prices Internet access to consumers and
possibly to CPs as well. The CPs then decide whether to enter a
competitive but differentiated market and the consumers decide
whether to connect to the ISP. Unlike prior works, we model
competition between the CPs together with consumer valuation
of content and quality-of-service provided by the ISP. We do so
by using a novel fusion of classical spatial differentiation models,
namely the Hotelling and the Salop models, in addition to simple
queue theoretic delay modeling. Via extensive simulations, we
show that the equilibrium in the non-neutral setting that allows
an ISP to charge a CP welfare-dominates the neutral equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network neutrality prohibits an ISP from discriminating
between packets of similar type of content from different
providers by either pricing their transit differently or by
providing them different qualities of service. As has been well
articulated by [1], ISP(s) that are not directly connected to CPs
and provide a transit to the content generated by the CPs have
argued that CPs are cornering good amounts of dividends on
an investment that was made by the ISPs. While ad-revenues
are rising for the CPs, the transit prices that are a source of
revenue for such ISPs are decreasing. The ISPs would thus
like the CPs to pay for transit of their content or suffer loss
in quality-of-service.
On the other hand, the proponents of net neutrality point to
the detrimental effect that a non-neutral regime can have on
the CPs and by implication on the consumers. For example,
as pointed out in [2], a non-neutral regime could impact
innovation at the edge of the network, as it could now be
influenced by the ISPs that constitute the core of the network.
Allowing discriminatory pricing or provisioning of quality-
of-service may enable an ISP to adversely impact access of
content by consumers of some among competing CPs.
In this work, we will analyze net neutrality from the point
of view of a regulator whose mandate is to maximize the
sum welfare of all consumers, CPs, and the ISPs. Note that
the larger the number of CPs providing similar content, the
higher is the intensity of competition amongst providers.
More competition must increase consumer welfare. However,
too much competition amongst providers may squeeze their
revenues so much that they end up making negative returns on
the cost of their investment to set up business. Our regulator
can’t merely maximize consumer welfare but must contend
with the impact of too much competition on the welfare of
CPs. A natural line of inquiry is then to include such aspects in
any welfare analysis of net neutrality regulation. For example,
models used for analysis must capture competition in the
provider market. However, we are not aware of any previous
work that looks into this direction.
By nature, the ISP operates in a two-sided market. It sells
network access to both consumers and CPs. Consumers can
then choose to consume content from providers. Our model
is therefore a two-sided market model in the style of [2]. In
this paper, we restrict ourselves to analyzing the case of a
monopolist ISP. We model the interaction of the ISP, the CPs
and the consumers as a multi-stage game. The ISP moves first
to set access prices for both consumers and CPs. The CPs
move next making a binary choice of whether to enter the
market. Finally, consumers choose whether to connect to the
ISP. This structured interaction via a multi stage game permits
an analysis of the influence of the pricing decisions of the ISP
on the size of the CP market and the size of the consumer
market. Another feature of our modeling is that CPs provide
all their content free to consumers1; so their only source of
revenue is advertising.
In our model, all CPs provide similar content. However, dif-
ferences in consumer tastes imply that even at the same price
a consumer may prefer a certain CP over another. That is the
content providers are not perfect substitutes and their content
offerings are horizontally differentiated [5]. This guides how
the providers arrange themselves among the consumers of the
ISP. Similarly, consumers have non-price related preferences
with regards to the ISP. Additionally, we make the reasonable
assumption that it is more difficult for a consumer to find an
alternate ISP than it is to find an alternate CP.
To capture the aforementioned we use two workhorse mod-
els – namely the linear city model due to Hotelling [3] and
the circular city model due to Salop [4] – from the industrial
organization literature [5]. Note that a consumer consumes
the two products of network access sold by the ISP and
1This is motivated by the providers’ business model and agrees with the
literature.
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content sold by a CP. Technological constraints imply that
a consumer must first have network access to subsequently
consume content. We, therefore, face two product dimensions
– one for the ISPs and one for the CPs. To capture these, we
use a novel way to model our market, which we will call the
Hotelling-Salop model, where in we employ the Hotelling line
for the ISP dimension that determines how many consumers
connect to the ISP and then let the resulting segment of that
line to be the circumference of the Salop circle on which CPs
align to provide content to the consumers.
In our model, the ISP has a fixed amount of bandwidth
that it must use to service requests of content made by
its consumers. Thus one would expect the quality-of-service
(average delay in this paper) obtainable by any given consumer
to be impacted by the demands for content made by the other
consumers. To capture this fact, as in [6], we use the M/M/1
queueing model, which assumes that the aggregate consumer
demand at the ISP is modeled as a Poisson process and that
the time it takes for the ISP to service a consumer’s request
for content is well modeled by an exponential distribution.
The resulting average delay is treated as a cost borne by every
consumer. While the M/M/1 model is simplistic, it allows us to
capture the important fact that average delay (cost) suffered by
a consumer increases – slowly, when the aggregate demand is
small and doesn’t congest the available bandwidth, and rapidly
as the aggregate demand makes the network congested – as
the number of consumers of the ISP increase.
Finally, in our model, as in [2], network neutrality is defined
as the constraint that the ISP cannot charge the CPs.
Proposition 1 in Section IV-C summarizes our main result,
which is that the non-neutral equilibrium dominates the net
neutral equilibrium. As is borne out by our analysis, this is
because welfare depends on the two variables of consumer
and provider market size and not on the prices charged of
the consumers and providers. The prices do not matter for
welfare as they end up being mere transfers from one player
to another. A switch from a non-neutral to a neutral regime
leads to welfare losses on both counts – a decrease in the
consumer market size that it entails decreases the economic
value generated by consumers (net of any gains achieved
from reduced congestion costs); and an explosive increase in
the provider market size (way above the welfare optimum)
imposes costs that far outweigh any benefits to consumers
from increased diversity of content providers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides a limited overview of the growing literature on net
neutrality. In Section III, we provide a brief on the use of spa-
tial models to model competition and consumer preferences.
In Section IV, we set up the model and pursue the equilibrium
analysis under non-neutral and neutral regimes. We then go on
to show how to do a welfare analysis of equilibria and also
how to compute a welfare optimum. Computational analysis
is carried out in Section V. Lastly, we make a few concluding
remarks in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The contours of the debate on net neutrality are by now
well known and well articulated in works like [7] and [8].
As we state in the introduction, our modeling objective is
to compare in welfare terms the equilibriums in neutral and
non-neutral regimes. Non-neutrality introduces many feasible
strategies for the ISP, including two-sided pricing and the
possibility of prioritization of network lanes. The literature has
progressed on both these dimensions. In the direction of work
on lane prioritization, in [9] it is found that paid prioritization
can be welfare-superior to net neutrality. In [10] the authors
investigate optimal service differentiation for an ISP subject to
capacity constraints in an optimal control framework. In [11]
non-neutrality is studied in an economic model that allows
lane pricing by ISP and revenue generation for CP as well as
QoE improvement for the consumers. The economic benefits
for ISP and CP are analyzed using traffic traces from real
networks. However, lane prioritization is not the focus of our
work. In doing this, our work is closer in spirit to [2] where
too authors abstract from lane prioritization issues.
In the context of a two-sided pricing model, wherein ISP
charges both consumers and content providers, [12] studies
non-neutrality in an economic model including an ISP, a CP,
consumers and advertisers and shows that side-payments are
beneficial for both the ISP and the CP. In [13] the interaction
between an ISP and a CP is modeled as a Stackelberg game
with the objective of maximizing the total profit of both
players. In [1] the authors study the impact of competition
between ISPs on network neutrality. Authors in [14] analyze
a model with competing ISPs, multiple non-competing CPs
and a fixed number of consumers and study the feasibility of
imposing side-payments on CPs and its effect on the revenue
of both ISP and CP. Other works such as [15] and [16]
study the impact of net-neutrality on consumer utility and
investments in the network focusing on incremental bandwidth
allocation and caching, respectively.
While prior works consider competing ISPs and multiple
non-competing content providers, to the best of our knowl-
edge, our work is the first attempt to study non-neutrality with
a focus on competition issues in the provider market for a
particular content type. We are interested in how the potential
of two-sided pricing introduced by non-neutrality affects the
competitive landscape of the provider market, as well as the
consumer market base, with consequences for welfare.
In terms of modeling choices, our work is closely related
to [2] and [6]. However, while we study competition in
the content provider market, authors in [2] model content
providers as many independent monopolies. Also, in our work
consumers face a congestion cost that is absent in [2].
III. MODELING CONSUMER CHOICE AND COMPETITION
We need to model consumer preference for competing
content providers and for the ISP connection. We will think
of both content and the ISP connection as economic goods of
which the consumers are the buyers and the content providers
and the ISP are respectively the sellers.
Consumer preference is often guided by a mix of price and a
myriad of non-price factors. To exemplify, while both Flipkart
and Amazon are content providers in the e-commerce space
in India and they have similar transaction costs, some Indian
consumers may prefer one over the other. Such non-price
factors are modeled in the industrial organization [5] literature
using spatial models of product differentiation. Spatial models
use an abstraction of a single dimension – a Hotelling line
or the perimeter of a Salop circle – to capture all non-
price factors. Buyers and sellers are identified by locations
on this dimension. A buyer’s distance from a seller on the
single dimension captures the non-price aspects of the buyer’s
preference for the seller. On this dimension, for our example,
a consumer that prefers Flipkart will be closer to Flipkart than
to Amazon.
In addition to the above, spatial models have a product
differentiation parameter that captures the ease with which a
buyer can substitute between offerings of competing sellers.
The smaller this parameter, the easier it is for the buyer to
substitute one seller for another. Specifically, the cost incurred
by a buyer to change its position (relative to the sellers) on
the single dimension is smaller.
To summarize, we use a richer model of price competition
with differentiated products that is closer to reality than the
simplistic model of price competition with no differentiation.
We remark that in [1] an alternative price based discrete choice
model is used to address many of the same modeling issues.
However, we find the spatial models attractive for their relative
simplicity.
IV. BASIC MODEL
There is a monopoly ISP and many potential CPs for whom
this ISP is not the originating ISP. Introduce the interval
[0, 1] as the Hotelling line of the standard horizontal product
differentiation model for the ISPs. Let the ISP be located at the
left extremity, location 0, of this line. There is a continuum of
consumers uniformly distributed on the Hotelling line. Let the
product differentiation parameter for the ISP be normalized
to 1. Non-price factors therefore impose a cost of x on a
consumer at location x on the Hotelling line.
Let t ∈ (0, 1) be the product differentiation parameter for
the CPs. Note that we restrict t < 1. This is to capture the fact
that it is easier to substitute between CPs than it is to substitute
between ISPs. Let y be the distance travelled by a consumer
to connect to a CP. This imposes a cost of ty on the consumer.
Consumers cannot connect to the CPs without first connecting
to the ISP. The CPs space themselves equidistantly on a Salop
circle whose perimeter, as we detail soon, is determined by
the consumers that choose to connect to the ISP.
All CPs provide free content to the consumers; their only
source of revenues is from advertising. Let r be the advertising
revenue per consumer, same for all CPs. Let d be the access
price charged by the ISP to the consumer. Let f be the fixed
cost of entering the provider market for any CP.
Consumers pay a congestion cost, which is the average time
the ISP takes to fulfill a consumer’s request for content. To
ISP, 0 xˆ 1
0, xˆ
CP1
CP2CP3
CP4
Fig. 1: Left Panel shows the Hotelling line for the ISP dimension.
Right panel shows the folded Hotelling line segment of length xˆ
as the Salop circle with the same circumference. It also shows the
symmetric alignment of CPs when n = 4 for when the consumer at
xˆ travels a distance xˆ/(2n) = xˆ/8 to reach a CP.
capture this, we model the ISP as a M/M/1 [17] service facility.
Specifically, following [6], we assume that the aggregate
demand for content from consumers created at the ISP is well
modeled by a Poisson process of rate λ per unit length of the
single dimension containing consumers connected to the ISP.
Further, the time taken by the ISP to service a consumer’s
request for content is exponentially distributed with a mean
service time of 1/µ. We assume λ < µ, which is required for
the average time to fulfill a request to stay bounded. Finally,
consumer requests are serviced by the ISP in a first-come-
first-served manner. This means that a request that arrives at
the ISP must wait for requests that arrived earlier to finish
obtaining service from the ISP.
Consumer monetary valuation of the total requested content
is v. In the non-neutral regime, the ISP can charge the CPs
for servicing requests for their content at an access price of
a. In contrast, the neutrality regime prohibits the ISP from
charging the CPs a price when it is not the originating ISP
for them, which we assume is the case here. The two regimes
therefore induce different market games through which the
entities interact.
A. Non-neutral Regime
In the non-neutral regime, the ISP, the CPs and the con-
sumers interact through the following multi-stage game:
1) ISP chooses the access prices: a for CPs and d for
consumers.
2) Consumers then choose whether to connect to the ISP.
3) CPs who are considering entering the market then si-
multaneously decide whether to enter or not. Suppose
n is the number of CPs who chose to enter. The CPs
locate equidistantly2 on a Salop circle whose perimeter
is the length xˆ of the initial segment of the Hotelling
line on which consumers connect to the ISP.
4) Consumers who have connected to the ISP then connect
to a CP and consume content.
We specify utility of a consumer who travels a distance x
on the Hotelling line to connect to the ISP and distance y on
2We follow [4] in making the assumption of symmetric alignment of CPs
on the Salop circle to focus on the entry decisions of CPs.
the Salop circle to connect to the CP as
u = v − x− ty − d− 1
µ− λxˆ , (1)
where λxˆ is the aggregate rate of request for content from
the length xˆ of consumers. The last term in the expression for
consumer utility u is the congestion cost faced by a consumer.
It is the resulting expected time the ISP takes to fulfill a
consumer’s request (called waiting time in [17]), given the
demand λxˆ.
We specify ISP’s profit as pi(d, a) = dxˆ + na. We specify
profits of CPi as pii = rDi − a− f , where Di is the demand
that CPi faces.
To determine this demand Di we must decide how the
CPs are aligned on the Salop circle relative to the marginal
consumer at xˆ who connects to the ISP. This is important for it
determines the distance traveled by this consumer on the Salop
circle and therefore affects the location xˆ on the Hotelling line.
Two extreme cases are possible. In one, illustrated in Figure 1,
the marginal consumer travels a distance xˆ2n ; in the other, the
consumer travels no distance, that is a CP locates itself at xˆ.
One could introduce an extra parameter β ∈ [0, 1], and specify
the distance traveled by the marginal consumer as βxˆ2n . The
extreme cases correspond to the values β = 1 and β = 0. We
will, however, choose β = 1 in our analysis for two reasons.
First, any β ∈ (0, 1] retains the structural feature that demand
on either side (whether xˆ or n) responds to prices (d and a)
on both sides. Therefore β = 1 carries the flavor of analysis
of any β ∈ (0, 1). Second, as will be clearer from analysis
that follows, β = 0, kills any dependence of xˆ on a and in
that sense is a special case.
To summarize, the parameters of the model are the con-
sumer valuation v, the advertising revenue r, the normalized
product differentiation parameter t, fixed CP costs f , the rate
of content request λ, and the service rate µ. The choice
variables are the prices a, d, the entry decisions of the CPs,
and the consumer decisions with regards to connecting to the
ISP and the CPs. The solution concept used to analyze the
model is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We will use the
backward induction algorithm to find subgame perfect Nash
equilibria of the multi-stage game.
Suppose we are in the subgame in which the mass of
consumers who chose to connect to the ISP is xˆ, the number
of CPs who chose to enter is n and they place themselves
symmetrically on the Salop circle whose perimeter is xˆ. So
CPi faces a demand Di = xˆn with consequent profits
pii = r
xˆ
n
− f − a. (2)
Under free entry, the optimal number of CPs who enter is
determined by the zero-profit condition yielding
n =
rxˆ
a+ f
. (3)
Ceteris paribus, an increase in ISP’s access price a to CPs
just adds to their fixed costs and reduces the number of CPs
that enter the market. Similarly, an increase in total demand
xˆ encourages entry.
The marginal consumer at xˆ travels a distance xˆ2n and is
indifferent between connecting to the ISP and not connecting
to it, that is it has a utility of 0. Setting the utility u in (1) to
zero, we can write
v − xˆ− txˆ
2n
− d− 1
µ− λxˆ = 0.
Using n from Equation (3) in the above equation, we have
v − xˆ− t(a+ f)
2r
− d− 1
µ− λxˆ = 0. (4)
Let xˆ(d, a) solve Equation (4). Then
xˆ(d, a) =
1
2λ
(
µ+ λ
(
v − d− t(a+ f)
2r
)
−
√
[µ− λ(v − d− t(a+ f)
2r
)
]2 + 4λ
)
. (5)
Further, using (3), we can calculate the number of CPs
n(d, a) =
rxˆ(d, a)
a+ f
. (6)
So the total demand on either side is decreasing in both the
access prices.
The ISP chooses the access prices d and a to maximize its
profits subject to the constraints that the resulting consumer
demand is nonnegative and the demand on the CP side is at
least 1. Formally it faces
[OPT1] max
d,a
pi(d, a) = dxˆ(d, a) + an(d, a)
subject to 0 ≤ xˆ(d, a) ≤ 1,
n(d, a) ≥ 1.
Define e(xˆ(d, a), d) := − dxˆ(d,a)/xˆ(d,a)dd/d to be the elasticity
of consumer demand xˆ(d, a) with respect to d. Similarly,
define e(xˆ(d, a), a) as the elasticity with respect to a. Let
e(n(d, a), d) and e(n(d, a), a) be the corresponding elasticities
of the number of CPs. Then an unconstrained optimum is a
solution to the following pair of equations in (d, a).
e(xˆ(d, a), d) +
an
dxˆ
e(n(d, a), d) = 1, (7)
e(n(d, a), a) +
dxˆ
an
e(xˆ(d, a), a) = 1. (8)
Equations (7) and (8) can be interpreted as follows. If the
monopolist ISP wants to increase d, he faces the traditional
margin vs volume tradeoff3. That is, he loses some consumers
but makes more on the existing consumers. However, since
the ISP is operating in a two-sided market, an additional
effect arises via network externalities. A decrease in consumer
3A profit maximizing monopolist facing a downward sloping demand curve
faces a tradeoff when choosing an optimal price. While a higher price implies
he makes more on the units that he sells (this is the margin effect), it also
implies a lower sales volume (this is the volume effect) because a higher price
leads to a lower demand.
market size makes entry unattractive for CPs. So the provider
market size decreases which reduces the ISP’s revenues from
that market4. Similarly, if the ISP wants to increase a, in
addition to facing the traditional margin vs volume tradeoff
in the provider market, it has to consider that increasing a
also decreases the consumer market size which has a second
order effect on further reducing volumes in the provider
market. The optimal access prices (d, a) balance these effects
simultaneously.
B. Net Neutrality Regime
Net neutrality regulation constrains the access price a that
the ISP can charge CPs to be zero. In the neutrality regime,
the ISP, the CPs and the consumers interact through the same
multi-stage game as in the non-neutral regime but with the
constraint a = 0.
The ISP faces the following optimization problem for choos-
ing the access price to consumers
[OPT2] max
d
pi(d, a = 0) = dxˆ(d, a = 0)
subject to 0 ≤ xˆ(d, a = 0) ≤ 1, (C1)
n(d, a = 0) ≥ 1, (C2)
where xˆ(d, a = 0) and n(d, a = 0) are found by setting a = 0
in Equations (5) and (6).
The unconstrained optimum of [OPT2] is given by the
value of d at which the standard margin vs volume tradeoff in
the consumer market is resolved optimally at
e(xˆ(d, 0), d) = 1 (9)
and is the solution if it lies in the constraint set. The corre-
sponding demands xˆ(d, a = 0) and n(d, a = 0) on both sides
can be computed by setting a = 0 and d at its optimal value
in Equations (5) and (6).
C. Welfare
The model we are studying is a transferable utility model.
This implies that the cardinal welfare W at any outcome is
defined to be the sum total of consumers’ surplus (CS), profits
(pii) of all CPs who enter and profit pi of the ISP. We have
4That the aforementioned is indeed an interpretation of Equation (7) is
established by looking at the more fundamental first order condition with
respect to d, which is
dpi
dd
= xˆ︸︷︷︸
margin effect
+ d
dxˆ
dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
volume effect
+ a
dn
dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
network externalities effect
= 0.
Equation (7) is equivalent to the above equation under the definition of
elasticities.
these expressions
pi = dxˆ+ na,
n∑
i=1
pii = rxˆ− nf − na,
CS =
∫ xˆ
0
(
v − d− 1
µ− λxˆ − x
)
dx−
n
∫ xˆ/n
0
ty dy =
(
v − d− 1
µ− λxˆ
)
xˆ− xˆ
2
2
− txˆ
2
n
,
W (xˆ, n) = pi +
n∑
i=1
pii + CS = (v + r)xˆ− xˆ
2
2
− txˆ
2
n
− nf − xˆ
µ− λxˆ . (10)
The access prices cancel out because these are mere transfers
from one party to another. The overall welfare in an equilib-
rium depends on the consumer market size and the number
of CPs that populate the provider market. If the consumer
market size xˆ increases, consumer surplus and advertising
surplus increase on account of more consumers being served
but welfare decreases on account of two factors – first, an
increase in consumer market size increases the heterogeneity
in consumer preferences which causes the product diversity
along the ISP and the CP dimension to decrease relatively;
second, an increase in consumer market size also increases
the congestion cost for everyone. Similarly, an increase in
the number of CPs who enter increases consumer surplus
because there is more product diversity on the CP dimension
for consumers but imposes greater fixed costs on the society.
As is standard in economic analysis, we compute the welfare
optimum as a solution to the following problem.
[OPT3] max
xˆ,n
W (xˆ, n)
subject to 0 ≤ xˆ ≤ 1,
n ≥ 1.
The solution to [OPT3] gives the size of consumer and
provider market that is best from society’s point of view when
we have taken everyone’s interest into account.
V. COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS
A look at equations (7), (8) and (9) and the corresponding
expressions for elasticities in the Appendix suggests that a
meaningful theoretical analysis does not look feasible. We,
therefore, do a computational analysis of [OPT1], [OPT2]
and [OPT3]. Recall that our objective is to determine whether
equilibrium welfare in one regime is higher than in the other.
Extensive computational analysis reveals that we get an
unambiguous welfare ranking of the non-neutral and neutral
equilibrium for a large range of parameter values. Specifically,
the non-neutral equilibrium welfare-dominates the neutral
equilibrium and is close to the welfare optimum. Figure 2
demonstrates this using example results for when the consumer
valuation v is equal to the advertising surplus r (Figures 2a-
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 2: (a) Equilibrium Welfare (b) Consumer Market Size and (c) Provider Market Size for v = r = 10, and (d) Equilibrium Welfare (e)
Consumer Market Size and (f) Provider Market Size for v = 10 and r = 2, for the cases of Non-neutral Equilibrium, Neutral Equilibrium
and Welfare Optimum. Other parameters used for these results are t = 0.5, f = 0.25, and µ = 3.
2c) and when v > r (Figures 2d-2f). Qualitatively, the results
(not shown) are similar for when v < r.
Figures 2b and 2e compare the consumer market size xˆ
under the neutral equilibrium, non-neutral equilibrium, and the
welfare optimum. For a fixed λ, we see that the consumer
market size under the non-neutral equilibrium is larger than
in the neutral regime. Also, it is similar to the size under
the welfare optimum. Further note from Figures 2c and 2f
that the provider market size n under the neutral regime is
significantly larger than under the welfare optimum and non-
neutral regimes. Since both the consumer and the provider
market size in the non-neutral equilibrium are closer to the
welfare optimum, the non-neutral equilibrium dominates the
neutral equilibrium in terms of welfare, which can be seen in
Figures 2a and 2d.
Lastly, note that, in line with expectation, as λ increases,
the resulting increase in congestion at the ISP causes the size
of the consumer market to steadily decrease under all three
regimes. A similar trend with respect to λ is seen for the
provider market size.
We summarize the takeaway from computational analysis
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. [Welfare Comparison of Equilibria]. For a
large selection of parameter values, the non-neutral regime
is welfare superior to neutral regime.
The intuitive reason why the result holds is because a switch
from a non-neutral regime to a neutral regime leads to welfare
losses on both counts – a decrease in the consumer market
size that it entails decreases the economic value generated by
consumers (net of any gains achieved from slightly reduced
congestion costs); and an explosive increase in the provider
market size (way above the welfare optimum) imposes costs
on society that far outweigh any benefits to consumers from
increased content diversity (number of providers).
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This paper melds a competition model from the industrial
organization literature with a network congestion model, in
which equilibrium analysis of non-neutral and neutral regimes
as well as a standard economic welfare analysis of equilibrium
is carried out. We restrict ourselves to the case of a monopolis-
tic ISP and a competitive provider market. Our results indicate
a surprisingly clean welfare analysis. While there are both
costs and benefits to increasing consumer and provider market
size, the neutral regime is welfare dominated by the non-
neutral regime. It remains to be seen whether this conclusion
changes when the ISP’s investment incentives are taken into
account.
We focused on the market for a particular content type with
symmetric providers with the same fixed cost. However, the
provider landscape is very rich, populated both by independent
monopolists (big players like Google, Amazon, Facebook etc.)
streaming different content types and competitors in each
content type (for instance Amazon, Flipkart, Alibaba etc. in
the e-commerce landscape). It is not immediately clear what
is a good way to model the richness of the provider landscape.
Another important extension of our work would be to the case
of duopoly ISPs as is done, for instance, in [2] and [18].
One difficulty with modeling is that while the neutral regime
is relatively clearly defined, the non-neutral regime throws up
several possibilities for the ISP. Apart from the feasibility of
pricing access to the CPs, the ISP can also introduce lane
prioritization and differentially price the lanes. Analyzing all
e(xˆ(d, 0), d) =
λd
[
µ− λ(v − d− tf
2r
)
+
√[
µ− λ(v − d− tf
2r
)]2
+ 4λ
]
[√[
µ− λ(v − d− tf
2r
)]2
+ 4λ
][
µ+ λ
(
v − d− tf
2r
)−√[µ− λ(v − d− tf
2r
)]2
+ 4λ
] . (11)
the richness of possibilities in a single model seems elusive
and analysis of a battery of models may be our best bet.
APPENDIX
Let us define
A = µ+ λ
(
v − d− t(a+ f)
2r
)
B =
√[
µ− λ(v − d− t(a+ f)
2r
)]2
+ 4λ
Then, we can compute
e(xˆ(d, a), d) =
λd
[
µ− λ(v − d− t(a+f)2r )+B]
B(A−B)
e(xˆ(d, a), a) =
λta
[
µ− λ(v − d− t(a+f)2r )+B]
2rB(A−B)
Equations (7) and (8) can now be reduced to the following
pair of equations in (d, a).
e(xˆ(d, a), d) =
da+ df
da+ df + ra
(12)
e(xˆ(d, a), a) =
f
a+ f
(13)
For the neutral regime, we have (11). Equation (11) can now
be used in Equation (9) to solve for d.
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